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1 Introduction  
Cross border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are the main force behind the surge in 
foreign direct investment. Yet despite its obvious quantitative importance, the reasons 
for cross border M&As are not well-understood. Following Neary (2004a) various 
motives for M&As can be distinguished in general. In the Industrial Organization (IO) 
literature two basic motives stand out: an efficiency motive and a strategic motive. 
Efficiency gains arise because takeovers increase synergy between firms that increase 
economies of scale or scope. Furthermore, from a strategic perspective M&As might 
change the market structure and as such have an impact on firm profits, which might 
even be reduced to zero (this is the so-called ‘merger paradox’, Salant et al., 1983).
2  
 
The problem with these explanations is that they are based on partial equilibrium 
models and do not deal explicitly with cross-border M&As. The partial modeling of 
M&As provides fundamental, but also limited understanding of this form of takeover, 
as  cross-border mergers are most likely related to economy-wide shocks such as 
economic integration, changes in the legal and regulatory environment, or possible 
asymmetric business cycles. Factors like these change the position of one country 
relative to another, and point in the direction of standard trade theories rather than to 
the more partial oriented IO models. The standard general-equilibrium trade theories, 
however, are not equipped to explain M&As as these often assume symmetric 
(representative) firms. This precludes strategic interaction between firms. This not 
only holds for the neo-classical perfect competition models, but also for the models 
based on increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition. The latter is 
forcefully brought forward by Neary (2004a,b), but also by the founding fathers of the 
second monopolistic competition revolution themselves – Avinash Dixit (2004) and 
Joseph Stiglitz (2004).  
 
The model developed by Neary (2003, 2004a) combines general-equilibrium trade 
theory with imperfect markets and strategic behavior between firms. This is difficult, 
because pricing decisions of large firms not only directly affect profits, but their 
                                                 
2 This result can be understood as follows. In a symmetric Cournot setting a merger initially increases 
industry concentration and therefore industry profits (the merging firms tend to reduce output in order 
to increase profits). In a Cournot setting, however, competitors react by increasing output, which harms 
the firms involved in the merger and the final result is that the merger has no effect whatsoever. As 
usual, strategic outcomes depend on the type of strategic interaction, form of demand schedules, and of 
the type of game that is played (see Neary, 2004).  
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market (pricing) behavior also affects national income and the real income of their 
customers. Furthermore, large firms could also influence factor prices. All these 
effects combined imply that firms have to “…calculate the full general equilibrium of 
the whole economy in making decisions” (Neary, 2003, p. 249). 
 
Neary’s (2003) General Oligopolistic Equilibrium (GOLE) model avoids some of the 
standard pitfalls of modeling oligopolistic markets, but simultaneously allows for 
strategic interaction between firms. Interestingly, by allowing for M&As in this model 
one can derive straightforward hypotheses on cross-border M&As, based on 
comparative advantage. Firms that have a comparative, and thus a cost, advantage 
have an incentive to merge or acquire a firm that is less strong. If these cost 
differences are economy-wide, the model explains cross-border M&As. Furthermore, 
the model also explains the stylized fact of M&A waves. An initial M&A makes the 
next one more attractive, which leads to M&A waves.  
 
The aim of our paper is to test (i) whether or not comparative advantage indeed 
explains the direction of M&As, and (ii) whether or not we observe M&As waves. To 
do so, we combine two large data sets: the bilateral trade data compiled by Feenstra et 
al. (2005) and the Global Mergers and Acquisitions database of Thomson Financial 
Securities Data. Both hypotheses above are supported by the data: M&As follow 
comparative advantage and current M&As are determined by past M&As. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some stylized facts on cross-
border M&As. Section 3 reviews the model developed by Peter Neary and highlights 
the two main hypotheses tested in this paper. Section 4 discusses and describes the 
two data sets. Section 5 presents our empirical findings and section 6 concludes.  
 
2 Cross-border mergers and acquisitions: some facts 
Table 1 shows that cross-border M&As constitute a main vehicle for FDI, especially 
for FDI flows to developed countries. Also, if one looks at cross-border M&As as a 
share of total M&A activity, it is clear that cross-border M&As are quite important. 
During, for instance, the period 1987-1999, which captures most of the so-called 4
th 
and 5
th merger wave, in terms of both the value and the number of the transactions, 
cross-border M&As, on average, made up for about 25-30% of total M&A activity 
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(Schenk, 2002). As Table 1 suggests, cross-border M&As are particularly relevant 
within the group of developed countries. OECD data show that, measured as a share 
of their national GDP, the UK and the Netherlands, followed by Germany and France, 
are the leading countries in cross-border M&As. Firms from these countries are most 
active in acquiring (stakes in) firms in other countries. At the peak of the 5
th merger 
wave in the late 1990s, for instance, cross-border M&As (as a percentage of GDP) 
were 16.3 in the UK and 13.7 in the Netherlands.  
 
Table 1 Cross-border M&A investments (percent of FDI inflows to the host countries) 
  1987-91 1992-94 1995-97 1998-2001 
World  66.29 44.75 60.18  76.23 
Developed  countries  77.49 64.93 85.39  88.96 
Developing and transition economies  21.94  15.49  25.79  35.74 
Source: Barba-Navaretti and Venables (2004, p.10). 
 
To date, the best and most extensive data source for M&As is the Global Mergers and 
Acquisitions database of Thomson Financial Securities Data (Thomson, hereafter). 
Thomson gathers information on M&As exceeding 1 million US dollar. Its main 
sources of information are financial newspapers and specialized agencies like 
Bloomberg and Reuters. Our Thomson data set begins in 1979 and ends in April 
2005. It should be kept in mind that until the mid-1980s Thomson focused very much 
on M&As for the USA only, and it is only for about the last 20 years that (systematic) 
M&A data gathering took place for other (developed) countries. For more information 
on the specifics of the Thomson data set we used for our analysis, see section 4.  
 
Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, and Zulehner (2003) use the Thomson M&A data base for 
the period 1981-1998 and provide the summary statistics on which Table 2 is based. 
For each country (group) Table 2 gives the number of M&A deals, the average deal 
value (in millions of US $) and the percentage of cross-border M&As. Table 2 
illustrates the dominant position of the USA in terms of the number of M&A deals 
(which is partly a reflection of the US-bias in the Thomson data set). At the same time 
it is clear that for cross-border M&As, Continental Europe and the UK outstrip the 
USA. The relatively high share of cross-border M&As in Europe reflects the fact that 
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the process of European economic integration has stimulated cross-border M&A 
activity. The relative importance of cross-border M&A is even larger for Japan, but 
the overall number of deals is rather low. Gugler et al (2003) also show for their 
sample that on average the profit rate of the acquiring firm is higher than for the target 
firm (which can be interpreted as evidence for productivity differences). The main 
point is that cross-border M&As make up a large part of total M&A activity. A 
similar conclusion is reached by Rossi and Volpin (2004), who use the cross-border 
M&A ratio, the percentage of completed M&A deals in which the acquirer is from a 
different country than the target. For their sample of 49 countries (based on the 
Thomson data set), the cross-border ratio is on average about 43 percent.    
 
Table 2 Summary statistics on M&As for selected countries, 1981-1998 
  Number of deals 
(thousands) 
Average deal value 
(million US $) 
Percent  
cross-border 
USA 21.148  246.7  10.6 
UK 4.717  158.3  29.9 
Continental Europe  9.595  285.9  33.5 
Japan 0.646  464.9  52.6 
Australia / New 
Zealand / Canada 
3.232 156.0  30.0 
Rest of the World  5.262  128.3  28.5 
Source: Gugler, Mueller, Yurtoglu, and Zulehner (2003), p. 633-634 
            
Finally, there is one important stylized fact as to the development of M&A activity 
over time: they come in waves. It is common to distinguish between five merger 
waves during the 20
th century, three of which are recent (Andrade, Mitchell, and 
Stafford, 2001). The 3
rd wave took place in the late 1960-early 1970s, the 4
th wave ran 
from about the mid 1980s until 1990, and the 5
th wave started around 1995 and ended 
in 2000 with the collapse of the “New Economy”. Merger waves are very much 
(positively) correlated with increases in share prices and p/e ratios and with the 
overall business cycle in general. When one sticks to standard M&A motives, like the 
efficiency argument, it is rather difficult to explain the synchronicity of M&As. 
Interestingly, Gugler, et al. (2004) find that merger waves can be understood if one 
acknowledges that M&As do not  boost efficiency and hence do not increase 
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shareholders’ wealth, but instead find that M&A waves are best looked upon as the 
result of overvalued shares and managerial discretion. In section 4 we will see if, just 
like the theoretical model predicts, M&A waves are also present in the data when one 
only looks at cross-border M&As. For the case of the USA and restricting their 
sample to firms that are publicly traded, Andrade et al. (2001) show that with each 
merger wave the value of the M&A deals (measured by firms’ market capitalization) 
increases strongly. Merger waves in Europe seem to follow those in the USA with a 
short lag, and until the most recent (completed) merger wave, the number and value of 
M&A deals during these waves fell short compared to those in the US counterpart. 
But during the 5
th merger wave, European firms engaged in a number of (mega) 
M&As with the cross-border take-over of Mannesmann (Germany) by Vodafone 
(UK) for 172 billion US$ in 2000 as to date the largest M&A in Europe.  These facts 
are clearly interesting, but they do not tell us much about the motives for M&As. The 
next section therefore presents a model explaining cross-border M&As. 
 
3 A model of mergers and acquisitions: GOLE 
In this section we give a brief description of the GOLE model and formulate the 
central hypotheses we like to test.
3 We distinguish between two countries: Home and 
Foreign, where an asterisk denotes Foreign variables when appropriate. Suppose there 
is a continuum of markets indexed by  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ z  in which there are n domestic firms 
with unit costs   under Cournot competition (and thus n* foreign firms with unit 
costs  ).
) (z c
) ( * z c
4 Consumers maximize preferences subject to a budget constraint, see 
equation (1), where U  is utility, I  is income,   is the price of good  , and  ) (z p z ) (z x  
is the demand for good z . If we let λ  denote the marginal utility of income (the 
Lagrange multiplier), then  )] ( )[ / 1 ( ) ( z x b a z p − = λ  gives the demand for good   in 
Home. The quadratic specification allows perfect aggregation over different countries, 
so the simple total demand function is given in (2), where 
z
) ( * ) ( ) ( z x z x z x + ≡ , 
*) /( *) ( λ λ + + ≡ a a a , and  *) /( λ λ + ≡b b . Note that firms are large in their own 
sector, where they behave strategically, but small relative to the economy as a whole.  
 
                                                 
3 A complete description and derivation of the model is given in Neary (2003, 2004). 
4 For now we take the unit costs as given, but they are determined in general equilibrium. There are no 
fixed costs of production as these provide a well-known incentive for M&As. 
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(1)  [] ∫ − =
1
0
2 ) ( ) 2 / 1 ( ) ( max dz z x b z x a U ; s.t.  ∫ ≤
1
0
) ( ) ( I dz z x z p  
(2)     ) ( ) ( z x b a z p − =
 
The first order condition for profit maximization for a firm active in sector z is equal 
to:  , where   is the firm’s supply. From this it follows directly 
that the firm’s profits, 
) ( ) ( ) ( z y b z c z p = − ) (z y
π  say, are proportional to the square of output  .  In 
equilibrium, the output for domestic and foreign firms will depend on the number of 
competitors, the unit costs, and the parameters. Using the first order conditions and 
equating total supply and demand in the market we can determine a firm’s output:
2 ) (z y b = π
5
(3) 
) 1 * (
*) ( * ) )( 1 * (
) , *, , * , (
+ +
− − − +
=
n n b
c a n c a n
b a c c n n y   
 






F: foreign production only













F: foreign production only










Figure 1 summarizes the situation in a two country setting for all markets. The axes 
depict marginal costs in both countries. From (3) we see that domestic firms have a 
positive output level only if their costs are below a weighted average of the demand 
intercept and the foreign firm’s costs:  * ) 1 ( 0 0 c a c ξ ξ − + < , with  *) 1 /( 1 0 n + ≡ ξ . This 
                                                 
5 Similarly for a foreign firm, of course. 
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condition divides the cost area in Figure 1 in four regions. If costs are too high for 
both firms, there is no production (area O). If domestic costs are much higher than 
foreign costs, only foreign firms will produce (area F). If foreign costs are much 
higher than domestic costs, only domestic firms will produce (area H). If domestic 
and foreign costs are neither too high or too different, both domestic and foreign firms 
will produce (area HF). Comparative advantage is most easily incorporated using a 
Ricardian model based on Dornbusch et al. (1977). If labor is the only input and  ) (z α  
is the unit labor requirement in sector  , unit costs are simply given by  z ) ( ) ( z w z c α = , 
where   is the wage rate. If we now rank the sectors such that the Home country is 
efficient in sectors with a low value of 
w
z , as indicated by the zz-line in Figure 1, the 
domestic firms will be the only producers for low values of z , both countries will be 
active for intermediate values of z , and the foreign firms will be the only producers 
for high values of  z .
6 The cut-off values will be determined in general equilibrium by 
the labor market clearing conditions. Note in particular that the zz-line will shift in 
response to changes in the wage rates.  
 
We can now analyze the profitability of mergers and acquisitions within this model. 
Let “1” and “0” indicate the post- and pre-merger situation, respectively. Then the 
gain of taking over a Home firm,   say, for a foreign firm is given by:  H G




1 > − − − = n n n n n n GH π π π  
 
The first term (in square brackets) relates to the gain in profitability from reduced 
competition by taking over the domestic firm. The second term indicates the cost of 
acquiring the domestic firm, equal to compensating the owners for their profit loss. 
Since the cost of acquiring the domestic firm is small if this firm has high costs, 
leading to a low output and profit level (see equation 3), it pays to take over a 
domestic firm if you have a cost advantage. On the other hand, the cost advantage 
should not be too big, because otherwise there are no active foreign firms to take over. 
Neary (2004a) therefore shows that M&As take place at the borders of the FH area in 
Figure 1, enlarging the areas in which only domestic or only foreign firms are active.  
                                                 
6 Note that the zz-line could be a curve instead of a line, but this is not material to our discussion. 
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It turns out that (4) holds if domestic costs are above a weighted average of the 
demand intercept and the foreign costs:  * ) 1 ( 1 1 c a c ξ ξ − + > , with  0 1 0 ξ ξ < < .
7 This 
determines the shaded areas in Figure 2 where it is profitable to take over other firms, 
namely if stronger firms take over not too-weak firms. For ease of exposition the 
general equilibrium consequences of allowing for M&As are illustrated for two 
symmetric countries in Figure 2. The   line indicates the distribution of costs and 
sectors at the initial trade equilibrium, before M&As are possible. Once these are 
allowed, the M&As cause profits to increase and the demand for labor and the wage 
rate to fall. This leads to the inward shift of the   curve from   to  . Evidently, 
this general equilibrium effect influences the range of firms actually taken over and 
the distribution of sectors specializing either completely or incompletely, but it does 
not change any of the main implications of the model. Since the (strong) acquiring 
firms have cost advantages and are exporters, we will identify them by the popular 
notion of revealed comparative advantage frequently used in the empirical 
international trade literature, which brings us to: 
0 zz
zz 0 zz 1 zz
 
                                                 
7  [] [ ]
[]
* ;
) 1 )( 1 * ( 2
) 1 ( * ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 )( 1 * ( 2
2
2 2
1 n n N
N n nN
N n N n N n nN
+ ≡
− + +
− + + − − + +
≡ ξ , see Neary (2004). 
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Hypothesis 1  
Acquiring firms operate in sectors with a higher revealed comparative advantage. 
 
This hypothesis, based on the work of Peter Neary, is new and it is tested here for the 
first time. Our second hypothesis involves the phenomenon of mergers waves. It is 
already well-established empirically, see for example Evenett (2003), and there are 
alternative theoretical explanations for this phenomenon, see, for example, Gorton, 
Kahl, and Rosen (2005) who argue that a technological or regulatory change can 
induce a preemptive wave of defensive acquisitions.
8 Within the Neary framework, 
the crucial point to note regarding equation (4) on the profitability of M&As is: (i) 
that non-participating firms also benefit from the takeover through a reduction of 
competition, and (ii) an M&A increases the profitability, and thus attractiveness, of 
the next M&A. This leads to a ‘wait and see’ or ‘after you’ effect which Neary, using 
a game-theoretic setting, translates into a theory of merger waves.  
 
Hypothesis 2
Mergers and acquisitions come in waves. 
 
4  Confronting the cross-border M&A data with trade data    
4.a M&A characteristics 
The Thomson data set allows us to analyze Mergers & Acquisitions (M&As) for a 
large range of countries and years. After some preliminary investigations, we decided 
to restrict our analysis to cross-border merger deals in the period 1980 – early 2005 
for five rather active countries, varying in size and geographic location, namely 
Australia, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States (see 
section 2).
9 This resulted in 11,721 observations, or about 28.5 per cent of all cross 
border M&As, as summarized in Table 3. The USA was the most active country (40.3 
percent of the acquisitions and 43.7 percent of the targets), closely followed by the 
UK (39.5 and 27.6 percent, respectively). Note that cross-border M&As with acquirer 
                                                 
8 Fridolfsson and Stennek (2005) argue that M&As may reduce profits if being an ‘insider’ is better 
than being an ‘outsider’. In general, they show the difficulty of accurately estimating M&A profits. 
9 At this stage we included all cross border M&As with a value above $1 million between 1 January 
1979 and 4 April 2005 where the acquirer and target were located in one of the countries above. For 
this period the Thomson data set gives a total of 159,791 completed M&A deals. Of these deals a total 
of 41,106 are cross-border M&As. Restricting the cross-border M&As for both acquirer and target firm 
to only apply for the USA, UK, The Netherlands, Australia, and France finally gives the 11,721 
observations on cross-border M&As used in our analysis. 
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and target located in the same country are possible, for example when an American 
firm takes over another American firm that is active abroad. About 48 per cent of 
M&As can be classified as horizontal M&As at the 2-digit level. In most cases the 
M&A is a complete takeover (72.4 percent) or results in a complete takeover (76.8 
percent). The distribution is very skewed and very close to a log-normal distribution, 
with a mean value of $186 million and a median value of $20 million.  
 
Table 3  Overview of mergers and acquisitions; all sectors, 1980-2005 
   Acquirer   
 AUS  FRA  USA  GBR  NLD  sum 
#  of  M&As        
Target  AUS  562 23 388  351 26  1,350 
  FRA 14 223  425  608 74  1,344 
  USA  231  310 2,136  2,229 213 5,119 
  GBR  137  249 1,602  1,095 154 3,237 
  NLD 13  52 178  351 77 671 
  sum  957  857 4,729  4,634 544  11,721 
p e r   c e n t         
  AUS  4.8 0.2 3.3 3.0 0.2  11.5 
  FRA 0.1 1.9 3.6 5.2 0.6  11.5 
  USA 2.0  2.6 18.2  19.0 1.8 43.7 
  GBR  1.2 2.1  13.7  9.3 1.3  27.6 
  NLD  0.1 0.4 1.5 3.0 0.7 5.7 
  sum  8.2  7.3 40.3  39.5 4.6 100 
Horizontal M&As (2-digit sic level):  5,628  (48.0%) 
100 % acquired in M&A  8,487  (72.4%) 
100 % owned after M&A  9,007  (76.8%) 
Value of transaction (million $):  mean  186.17 
       median  20.00 
       maximum  60,286.67 
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4.b Concordance 
Since we want to investigate to what extent (revealed) comparative advantage (as 
measured by the Balassa index) affects M&As, we have to make a connection 
between the sectors as identified by SIC code in the Thomson data base and trade data 
which allows us to calculate the Balassa index. For the latter, we use the database 
from Feenstra et al. (2005), which provides trade data between countries by 
commodity, classified by SITC (revision 2) code at the 4-digit level of detail.  
 
Table 4 Overview of M&As; concordance subset ( ' I ), 1980-2005 
   Acquirer   
 AUS  FRA  USA  GBR  NLD  sum 
#  of  M&As        
Target  AUS  106  3 85  64 3  261 
  FRA  3  54 160  185 14 416 
  USA 56 112  624  832 71  1,695 
  GBR 21  74 497  252 34 878 
  NLD 3  14  67 113 15 212 
  sum  189  257 1,433  1,446 137 3,462 
p e r   c e n t         
  AUS  3.1 0.1 2.5 1.8 0.1 7.5 
  FRA 0.1 1.6 4.6 5.3 0.4  12.0 
  USA 1.6  3.2 18.0  24.0 2.1 49.0 
  GBR  0.6 2.1  14.4  7.3 1.0  25.4 
  NLD  0.1 0.4 1.9 3.3 0.4 6.1 
  sum  5.5  7.4 41.4  41.8 4.0 100 
Horizontal M&As (2-digit sic level):  2,234  (64.5%) 
100 % acquired in M&A  2,833  (81.8%) 
100 % owned after M&A  2,987  (86.3%) 
Value of transaction (million $):  mean  175.93 
       median  22.50 
       maximum  27,223.95 
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As a first step, a concordance between SITC rev. 2 and the international industrial 
classification ISIC rev. 2 is applied.
10 This step results in trade data classified by 
sector at the 4-digit level of detail for manufacturing industries. The next step is to 
apply a concordance between ISIC rev. 2 and the SIC87 industrial classification, 
which is the classification used in the Thomson mergers & acquisitions database. This 
concordance, from 3-digit ISIC rev. 2 industries to 2-digit SIC87 industries, is based 
on a matching of industry names. Since SIC87 was initially derived from ISIC rev. 2, 
this matching was fairly straightforward.
11  
 
Figure 3 Sector distribution of M&As, concordance subset  ' I , 1980-2005 
Sector distribution of M&As, # obs.























The figure gives brief sector descriptions only; see Table 1 for details. 
 
                                                 
10 For this concordance, see: 
http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/Concordances/Fr
omSITC/sitc2.isic2.txt  
11 This concordance is available upon request.  
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The above exercise results in 20 2-digit SIC sectors for which we have reliable trade 
data (and thus information on revealed comparative advantage) available. A complete 
list of countries and SIC-sectors in our sample can be found in Appendix I. Finally, 
we restricted our set of M&A observations to those 2-digit sectors for which both 
acquirer and target are an element of the concordance subset ( ' I ), see 4.c below. This 
reduced the number of observations to 3,462, with the summary information as given 
in Table 4. Note that, as a result of this restriction, the share of horizontal M&As 
increased substantially (from 48.0 to 64.5 percent), as did the share of complete 
takeovers (from 76.8 to 86.3 percent complete ownership after the M&A). There is 
very little effect on the value distribution of M&As (which is still log-normal).  
 
Figure 3 depicts the distribution of the number of M&As over the various sectors of 
the concordance subset  ' I . In general, the correlation for a sector is high, which is not 
too surprising in view of the high share of horizontal M&As. The most active sectors 
were SIC 28 (Chemicals), SIC 36 (Electronics), SIC 35 (Ind. machinery), SIC 38 
(Instruments), and SIC 20 (Food).  
 
4.c Balassa index characteristics 
Let   denote the value of exports of sector 
j
t i X , I i∈  from country   in period 




t i BI ,
(7)  ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ≡ ≡ ≡ ≡
ij
j
t i, t j
j










t i X X X X X X where
X X
X X
BI ; ; ;
/
/
, ,  
If  , indicating that sector i’s share in country j’s exports in period t is larger 
than in the group of reference countries  , country j is said to have a revealed 
comparative advantage in sector i. We have annual observations available for the 
period 1980-2000. Our group of reference countries   consists of the OECD 











                                                 
12 Note that, when calculating the Balassa index for the respective sub-groups, we do include all 
exports of goods and services for an individual country (sectors I) and relate this to the exports of all 
reference countries (OECD countries J), see equation (7).  
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Table 5  Summary information for Balassa index (BI), 1980 - 2000 
a. Benchmark 
Statistic All  AUS  FRA  NLD  GBR  USA 
#  Observations  2,100 420 420 420 420 420 
Mean  0.94  0.85 0.89 1.03 0.96 0.98 
Median  0.79  0.33 0.82 0.72 0.87 0.91 
Variance  0.59  1.37 0.14 0.87 0.30 0.25 
Minimum  0.00  0.00 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.14 
Maximum  6.44  6.44 2.06 5.62 3.09 2.87 
#  BI  >1  676  98  164 104 139 171 
Share BI > 1 (%)  32.2  23.3  39.0  24.8  33.1  40.7 
b. M&A  acquirer 
Statistic All  AUS  FRA  NLD  GBR  USA 
#  Observations  3,462 189 257 137  1,446  1,433 
Mean  1.08  1.24 1.06 1.10 1.04 1.10 
Median  1.00  0.77 1.13 0.89 0.98 1.01 
Variance  0.19  1.34 0.10 0.39 0.11 0.11 
Minimum  0.01  0.01 0.29 0.13 0.16 0.19 
Maximum  6.44  6.44 1.75 3.89 2.58 2.48 
#  BI  >1  1,783 61 150 48 673  851 
Share BI > 1 (%)  51.5  32.3  58.4  35.0  46.5  59.4 
c. M&A  target 
Statistic All  AUS  FRA  NLD  GBR  USA 
#  Observations  3,462 261 416 212 878  1,695 
Mean  1.08  1.12 1.00 1.14 1.04 1.11 
Median  1.00  0.71 0.96 0.90 0.99 1.03 
Variance  0.24  1.29 0.11 0.62 0.12 0.12 
Minimum  0.00  0.00 0.29 0.12 0.15 0.15 
Maximum  6.44  6.44 1.75 5.62 2.43 2.54 
#  BI  >1  1,800 76 200 79 421  1,024 
Share BI > 1 (%)  52.0  29.1  48.1  37.3  47.9  60.4 
For M&A acquirer and target in the period 2001-2005 the (most recent) BI of 2000 was used. 
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Table 5 provides summary statistics on the distribution of the Balassa index for the 
five countries separately and combined for three different data selections, namely (a) 
the benchmark distribution for all sectors in our data set for all years, (b) the 
distribution of the Balassa index for the acquirer of an M&A, and (c) similarly for the 
target of an M&A. A few observations on these statistics can readily be made.  
  The distribution differs per country. The benchmark median for the USA (0.91), 
for example, is almost three times that for Australia (0.33). Similarly, the benchmark 
share of sectors with a Balassa index above 1 is higher for the USA (40.7 percent) 
than for Australia (23.3 percent) and the Netherlands (24.8 percent).  
  The Balassa index is higher for the acquirer than the benchmark. For each 
individual country and for the group as a whole, the mean, median, and the share of 
sectors with a Balassa index above 1 is higher for the M&A acquirer distribution than 
for the benchmark distribution.  
  The Balassa index is higher for the target than the benchmark. Again, for all 
countries the mean, median, and the share of sectors with a Balassa index above 1 is 
higher for the M&A target distribution than for the benchmark distribution.  
 
Figure 4 Relationship between M&As and revealed comparative advantage 















These findings are illustrated for the share of sectors with a Balassa index above 1 in 
Figure 4. Note that the Balassa index appears to be higher for both acquirer and target. 
To some extent this represents a problem for the above theory as the acquirer is 
thought to be a more efficient firm than the target. To some extent this is in line with 
the above theory, as the difference between the acquirer’s and the target’s efficiency 
should not be too large. As we argue below, the distributions do not differ 
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significantly between acquirer and target, so we follow the convention of focusing on 
the acquirer’s perspective in the sequel.  
 
The disadvantage of focusing on a few summary statistics, as given in Table 5, is that 
it ignores the majority of the information available in the underlying distribution 
functions. Although these distributions of the Balassa index for the individual 
countries and the group as a whole are not known, we can apply the distribution-free 
Harmonic Mass index procedure developed by Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (2005) 
to test formally if any pair of distribution functions is identical.
13 With a 5 per cent 
significance level, this leads to the following formal conclusions (see Appendix II): 
  The benchmark distribution differs significantly from the M&A acquirer and 
target distributions, both in the aggregate and for individual countries. 
  The M&A acquirer distribution does not differ significantly from the M&A target 
distributions, both in the aggregate and for individual countries, with the exception 
of France. 
  The distributions for individual countries differs significantly, with the exception 
of France – USA in the benchmark. 
 
Figure 5 Comparison of comparative advantage distributions, 1980-2005 








































These conclusions are illustrated for the aggregate distributions in Figure 5 using P-P 
(probability – probability) plots, a method for comparing distribution functions used 
as the basis for the Harmonic mass index which, if the underlying distributions are 
identical, results in a plot coinciding with the diagonal. Clearly, the deviation between 
                                                 
13 They also explain the advantages of this procedure over the more commonly used Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon test.  
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the plot and the diagonal is large if we compare the benchmark with the acquirer’s 
distribution and small if we compare the acquirer’s and the target’s distribution.  
 
Figure 6 M&A waves 




















































To get a first indication of M&A waves, we let   denote the number of M&As in 
sector   in the k  year period immediately preceding continuous time t (for all 
countries ' combined). We denote their sum by  , that is 
. Figure 6a depicts the evolution over time  ) (
1 t  a ) (
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have been two clear waves for all sectors combined, namely around 1990-1991 and 
around 1999-2001 (this is most evident over a two-year period). Figures 6b and 6c, 
similarly, depict the evolution over time within a one-year and two-year period for 
some individual sectors from the acquirer’s perspective.
14 Although the sector peaks 
coincide largely with the aggregate peaks around 1990 and 2000, there are also sector-
specific peaks, for example at the end of 2004 for sic 28 (Chemicals and allied 
products) and around 1995-1996 for sic 20 (Food and kindred products). 
 
5  Empirical results 
To test the theoretical model outlined above from the acquirer’s perspective, we 
analyze the number of M&As undertaken by firms in a specific country and sector for 
the period 1980-2004. As there are 5 countries, 20 sectors, and 25 years, this leads to 
a total of 2,500 observations. Taking country- and sector-specific effects into account, 
our focus is on the impact of revealed comparative advantage as measured by the 
Balassa index and the idea that M&As come in waves. Our dependent variable is a 
discrete counting variable (the number of M&As in a specific country and sector in a 
given year) such that we can use the Poisson regression model (Greene, 2003), where 
it is assumed that M&As follow a Poisson distribution: 




= = ) & var( , ) & ( ,
!
) exp(
) & (# Prob A M A M E where
k




The model specifies the – conditional – mean as  ) ' exp( i x β , where the  i x  are the 
explanatory variables (and the  s β  semi-elasticities). The Poisson model, however, 
imposes the restriction that the conditional mean of the dependent variable is equal to 
its variance, whereas the negative binomial regression model generalizes the Poisson 
model – by introducing an individual unobserved effect into the conditional mean – 
and allows for over-dispersion in the data (variance exceeding the mean), see, for 
example Bloningen (1997), Coughlin and Segev (2000), Barry, Görg, and Strobl 
(2003), and Appendix II. Extensive experimentation using both approaches has shown 
that the Poisson process is not suitable for our data set, such that we only report and 
discuss the outcomes for the negative binomial model below. In short-hand notation: 
                                                 
14 At the sector level we can distinguish between the number of M&As in the acquirer’s sector and in 
the target’s sector in the k-year period preceding time t. The difference is generally small and 
disappears in the aggregate (when we sum over all sectors). 
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(9)  ) , , ( ) & (# Prob sector country waves Balassa f As M of = ,  
where Balassa refers to the Balassa index of equation (7) and waves refers to the 
variables depicted in Figure 6, conditional on country and sector dummies. We used 
the robust Quasi-Maximum Likelihood (QML) estimation procedure as it produces 
more consistent estimates of the parameters of a correctly specified conditional mean 
than the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation procedure, even if the distribution is 
incorrectly specified. The standard errors and significance levels reported below are 
based on the Huber/White robust covariance estimation procedure. The default 
country is the USA and the default sector number 34 (fabricated metal products).
15
 
The first column of Table 6 shows the comparative advantage effect as measured by 
the Balassa index. Since the structure of this index differs significantly between 
countries (section 4), we construct Balassa index–country interactions, to deal with 
these differences. The BI – AU variable, for example, reports the value of the Balassa 
index for Australia for the sector under consideration if the country is Australia, and 
zero otherwise.
16 There is strong support for Hypothesis 1 in all countries. We do not 
report the significant country and sector dummies (these are available upon request). 
In general, they indicate that, other things equal, Australia, France, and the 
Netherlands are less active in the cross border M&A takeover game than are the USA 
and the UK. There is no significant difference between the UK and the USA. Both 
results are robust throughout our estimation procedures.  
 
The second column of Table 6 shows that past history of M&As also determine 
current M&As. This indicates that waves are indeed a fundamental characteristic of 
M&As. We distinguish between two types of waves, namely a sector-wave effect and 
a total-wave effect, for two different time periods, namely the previous year and the 
previous two years. The variable Sector – 1, for example, measures the number of 
M&As in the same sector in the previous year (for all countries). Similarly, the 
variable Total – 2 measures the total number of M&As in all sectors (for all countries) 
in the previous 2 years. There is support for Hypothesis 2; for sector-waves only with 
a two-year horizon (positive) and for total-waves both with a one-year horizon 
(positive) and a two-year horizon (negative). In line with the model of section 3, this 
                                                 
15 We experimented a little with other default choices, but this did not materially influence the results. 
16 Note that we do not include the BI – USA variable to avoid (almost) overidentification. 
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suggests that the positive (after-you) effect of increased profitability of takeovers lasts 
about one year and evaporates in two years time. 
 
Table 6  M&A per sector per year regressions, 1980 - 2004 
Negative binomial count; (standard errors); [p-value] 
 Balassa  Waves  Both  Select 
Balassa  index      




  (0.0703)  (0.0697)  (0.0697) 
  [0.0000]  [0.0002]  [0.0002] 




  (0.2455)  (0.2311)  (0.2311) 
  [0.0962]  [0.1474]  [0.1473] 




  (0.1323)  (0.1273)  (0.1273) 
  [0.0774]  [0.1185]  [0.1186] 




  (0.0577)  (0.0560)  (0.0560) 
  [0.0033]  [0.0103]  [0.0102] 
W a v e s       
  Sector – 1    0.0042  0.0038   
   (0.0182)  (0.0177)  
   [0.8175]  [0.8308]  




    (0.0103) (0.0100) (0.0058) 
    [0.0041] [0.0053] [0.0000] 




    (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0031) 
    [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 




    (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0016) 
    [0.0795] [0.1118] [0.0702] 
Observations  2500 2500 2500 2500 





  [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
LR index (pseudo-R
2) 0.289 0.322 0.324 0.324 
*** = statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level, and + 15% level; Huber/White 
standard errors and covariance; all regressions include significant country and sector dummies 
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The third column of Table 6 combines the Balassa and wave effects. The results 
reported above are robust to this combination, although the Balassa estimates are 
somewhat weakened for France and the Netherlands if waves are included. The fourth 
column of Table 6 drops the insignificant sector – 1 variable, giving our final result. 
To summarize our conclusions: 
  Australia, France, and The Netherlands, other things being equal, are less active in 
the M&A takeover game than the UK and the USA.  
  M&As are undertaken by ‘strong’ firms, that is firms active in sectors with a 
revealed comparative advantage as measured by the Balassa index, in accordance 
with Hypothesis 1.  
  Waves play an important role in the M&A takeover game, in accordance with 
Hypothesis 2. Sector-waves with a (positive) two-year horizon and total-waves 
with a (positive) one-year horizon and a (negative) two-year horizon.  
 
Table A.3 in Appendix IV provides some further robustness checks. First, our trade 
data only allow us to calculate the Balassa index up to the year 2000.
17 We therefore 
used this most recent observation for the M&As in the years 2001-2004. Ignoring the 
last three years of observations does not materially affect our results. Similarly, we 
can only adequately calculate the wave variables with a one- and two-year lag, while 
it is argued that the Thomson sampling methodology is US-biased in the first half of 
the 1980s. Again, ignoring the first two- or five-years of observations does not 
materially affect our results, despite the more limited number of observations.  
 
6 Conclusions 
Traditionally, the modeling of M&As provides only a partial understanding of cross-
border M&As, which are most likely related to economy-wide differences between 
countries. This suggests that international trade theory is perhaps better suited to 
analyze cross-border M&As than IO models. Neary (2003, 2004a) combines general-
equilibrium trade theory with imperfect markets and strategic behavior of firms. 
Although this work is mainly theoretical, it leads to two testable hypotheses. First, 
acquiring firms tend to be efficient and therefore operate in sectors that have a 
revealed comparative advantage as measured by the Balassa index. Second, M&As 
                                                 
17 Changes in the Balassa index are generally gradual from one year to the next, see Hinloopen and van 
Marrewijk (2001).  
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come in waves as a given takeover generally makes the next takeover more attractive. 
To test these two hypotheses, we combine two extensive data sets: the bilateral trade 
data compiled by Feenstra et al. (2005) and the Thomson data on M&As. Using some 
robustness checks, we conclude that both hypotheses are supported by the data. The 
main novelty of the paper is the positive relationship between revealed compararative 
advantage and M&As. Future theoretical work, involving competing explanations for 
cross-border M&As, see for instance Rossi and Volpin (2004), should focus on better 
understanding this relationship, particularly from the target’s perspective. Future 
empirical research should extend the analysis to other countries. 
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Appendix I Country and sector description 
 
Table A.1 Overview of analyzed sectors ( I I ⊂ ' ) and countries ( )  J J ⊂ '
a. Sectors  ' I   b. Countries  '    J
SIC Description  Code  Name   
20  Food and kindred products  AUS  Australia 
21 Tobacco  products  FRA  France 
22  Textile mill products  NLD  Netherlands 
23  Apparel and other textile products GBR  United  Kingdom 
24  Lumber and wood products  USA  United States 
25  Furniture and fixtures     
26  Paper and allied products     
27 Printing  and  publishing     
28  Chemicals and allied products     
29  Petroleum and coal products     
30  Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products     
31  Leather and leather products     
32  Stone, clay, and glass products     
33 Primary  metal  industries     
34 Fabricated  metal  products     
35  Industrial machinery and equipment     
36  Electronic and other electric equipment     
37 Transport  equipment     
38  Instruments and related products     
39  Miscellaneous manufacturing industries     
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Table A.2 Harmonic Mass index; bilateral comparison of distribution functions (shaded cells are identical at 5% significance level)* 
  Benchmark  Mergers & Acquisitions 
               all acquirer  target
                              all AUS FRA NLD GBR USA acq  tar AUS FRA    NLD GBR USA AUS FRA NLD GBR USA
b e n c h m a r   k                   
  All  0.000                                  0.343 0.127 0.093 0.118 0.153 0.319 0.300 0.155 0.348 0.186 0.317 0.387 0.174 0.263 0.179 0.323 0.386
  AUS    0.002                                0.461 0.365 0.430 0.463 0.542 0.530 0.290 0.560 0.484 0.547 0.581 0.245 0.528 0.474 0.547 0.578
  FRA      0.002      0.175 0.094 0.075                        0.266 0.247 0.271 0.291 0.140 0.251 0.336 0.295 0.187 0.125 0.253 0.336
  NLD        0.002                            0.186 0.202 0.397 0.367 0.176 0.414 0.233 0.416 0.459 0.184 0.339 0.221 0.418 0.450
    GBR      0.002          0.082 0.241 0.224 0.269 0.272 0.097                0.224 0.333 0.287 0.159 0.104 0.233 0.335
    U S A        0.002        0.182 0.162 0.289 0.220 0.094          0.189 0.252 0.311 0.137 0.073      0.199 0.252
M & A s                        
    a c q - a l l         0.004  0.024                    0.410 0.090 0.211 0.079 0.097 0.431 0.131 0.204 0.077 0.111
    t a r - a l l          0.003                    0.389 0.091 0.184 0.093 0.102 0.411 0.119 0.177 0.091 0.108
    a c q - A U         S    0.019 0.417        0.315 0.423 0.458 0.072          0.368 0.298 0.424 0.451
    a c q - F R A            0.014                  0.228 0.108 0.130 0.438 0.131 0.230 0.108 0.128
    a c q - N L           D    0.017          0.237 0.290 0.338 0.151 0.048      0.246 0.277
    a c q - G B            R    0.008          0.170 0.442 0.134 0.234 0.021    0.181
    a c q - U S             A    0.012          0.483 0.188 0.277 0.170 0.029 
    t a r - A U S                 0.016          0.393 0.324 0.443 0.476
    t a r - F R A                  0.012        0.153 0.137 0.191
    t a r - N L D                   0.013      0.244 0.272
    t a r - G B R                    0.012    0.180
    t a r - U S A                     0.010 
#  obs  2100                                    420 420 420 420 420 3462 3462 189 257 137 1446 1433 261 416 212 878 1695
* Values in cells indicates Harmonic Mass index (exception: # obs); the solid borders indicate the most relevant comparisons, as emphasized in the main text. 
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Appendix III Negative binomial 
The log likelihood for the negative binomial given   is given by  i x
) / 1 ( log ) ! log( ) / 1 ( log ) , ( 1 log( ) / 1 (
)) , ( log( ) , (
2 2 2 2
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where   is a non-negative integer valued random variable and   is the conditional 
mean function. The following moment conditions hold: 
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such that   is a measure of the extent to which the conditional variance exceeds the 
conditional mean.  
2 η
© Brakman, Garretsen, and van Marrewijk, 2005    26 M&As: waves and comparative advantage 
Appendix IV Sensitivity analysis: period analyses 
Table A.3  M&A per sector per year regressions, various periods 
Negative binomial count; (standard errors); [p-value] 
  1980-2004 1980-2000 1982-2004 1985-2004 
Balassa  index      





  (0.0697) (0.0746) (0.0691) (0.0690) 
  [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0015] 




  (0.2311) (0.2517) (0.2329) (0.2334) 
  [0.1473] [0.2721] [0.1490] [0.1063] 
BI - NL  0.1987
+ 0.2341
* 0.1972 0.1524 
  (0.1273) (0.1328) (0.1263) (0.1333) 
  [0.1186] [0.0779] [0.1186] [0.2530] 





  (0.0560) (0.0623) (0.0536) (0.0501) 
  [0.0102] [0.0431] [0.0087] [0.0095] 
Waves      





  (0.0058) (0.0063) (0.0056) (0.0054) 
  [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 





  (0.0031) (0.0037) (0.0030) (0.0028) 
  [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 





  (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0014) 
  [0.0702] [0.0398] [0.0279] [0.0001] 
Observations  2500 2100 2300 1900 





  [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
LR index (pseudo-R
2)  0.324 0.330 0.313 0.296 
*** = statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level, and + 15% level; Huber/White standard 
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